The fundamental problem with the libertarian “reform” strategy was expressed by Murray Rothbard in “Strategies for a Libertarian Victory,” originally published in 1978 in Libertarian Review, and made available on-line by Scott Olmsted:
“Even in the short run, opportunism is self-destructive. Any new ideological movement or party, in order to acquire support—as in the case of new products or firms on the market—must differentiate its product from its established competitors. A Libertarian Party which, for example, sounds almost indistinguishable from right-wing Republicanism (as did the Tuccille campaign for New York governor in 1974), will fail if only because the voter presented with no clear alternative will quite rationally remain with right-wing Republicans.”
Some may answer Rothbard’s objection by saying that the LP is not a new party. True, the LP has been around for years, but it remains an untried commodity for many voters. Whether the LP is one, five, twenty, or fifty years old is irrelevant. The point is sounding like Demopublican lite is hardly a way to get voters to run the risk of “throwing their vote away.” Do you think more people would abandon Coke and Pepsi for RC if RC changed its formula to a watered down mixture of Coke and Pepsi?
This is especially true since watering down the platform will not change any of the other obstacles to third-party success. For example, changing the platform will not repeal a single ballot access law.
In fact, the short-term effect of the reformers “triumph” may be to weaken the party since watering down the libertarian message has alienated many of the party’s existing members and donors. I know of at least one long-time activist who has sworn off the LP for good after the events of Portland, while another is actually starting his own party. Alienating existing supporters is an odd way to begin building the party.
Even if they are right and a moderate Libertarian Party devoted to marginal rollbacks in state power could win what would be the point? The LP was founded not as a means of gaining power to achieve marginal gains in freedom but to advance the philosophy of libertarianism. Now, I am not suggesting that the LP should not advance transitional steps toward liberty. I am not even opposed to LP candidates running campaigns focusing on what can be achieved in the next 2, 4, or 6 years. However, LP members, and all libertarian activists, should always present transitional goals as just transitions and not imply that, say, just because we are advocating an immediate 20% reduction in taxes this year we do not want a 50% reduction next year and ultimately hope to repeal the 16th Amendment altogether.
The reformers seem to want libertarians to abandon our long-term goals, downplay important issues such as war, and maybe even advocate increasing state power in pursuit of short term gains.The last word on the flaws in this strategy belong to Rothbard:
“…by studiously avoiding the raising of ultimate goals or principles, the opportunist, at best, short-circuits the ultimate goal, and betrays it by failing to raise the consciousness of the public in the explicit direction of the final goal. The ultimate goal will not be reached automatically by itself; it can only be reached if a large group of adherents continues to hold high the banner of that ultimate, radical objective. But, if libertarians refuse to examine and put forward their ultimate goals, who will? The answer is no one, and therefore that objective will never be attained. Indeed, if libertarians fail to keep their ultimate objective in view, they will themselves lose sight of the objective, and descend into another gradualist, nonlibertarian reform movement, and the main purpose of having a movement in the first place will be lost.”
That said, I don’t think the libertarian reformers efforts are totally without value. I hope to blog on what the reformers got right and a modest proposal to bring together the reformers and the radicals.
9:46 pm on July 10, 2006
