It looks like the beltway libertarians at places like Reason and Cato have no interest in explaining the libertarian position on naturalization and citizenship.

Try an internet search of the phrase “libertarian position on naturalization and citizenship”—or some similar variation of those words. What you will find is a wide array of articles on immigration from the usual “libertarian” sources. But, that hardly answers our question since immigration and naturalization are two very different things. These articles often mention the words “citizenship” and “naturalization” in passing. But they never explain why, based on libertarian principles, we should be restrictionist or expansionist on granting citizenship to migrants.

Consider, for example the recent rash of articles on birthright citizenship at Reason. Every single article that I’ve seen is simply an article using legal positivist claims to support the status quo. See here, here, and here, for example. The “debate” is little more than lawyers stating what they think the written law says with the implied conclusion that birthright citizenship—and, presumably expanded naturalization—is good because the US Constitution says so. This is far cry from arguing in favor of expanded naturalization based on actual libertarian principles. The US Constitution is many things, but it’s certainly not a proxy for laissez-faire and libertarianism.

So, what is the libertarian position on naturalization and citizenship? It can’t be the same thing as the position on immigration. Immigration, after all, is closely tied to the matter of property rights. Citizenship and naturalization, on the other hand, aren’t about property rights at all. It is, therefore, not at all clear that we must favor more citizenship or more naturalization in the name of freedom or free markets. In fact, there is good reason to believe that an expansionist view on naturalization and citizenship increases state power at the expense of our freedoms.

Property Rights vs. Naturalization “Rights”

What is the difference between immigration and naturalization?

Immigration is the process of human beings moving from one place to another. In the current context, this nearly always means migration across an international boundary. Immigration policy, therefore, is the process of restricting—or not restricting—the movement of these persons. In practice, the question of immigration policy necessarily raises the question of whether or not government authorities ought to restrict migration by various regulations. Immigration regulation necessarily involves the regulation of property, whether we’re talking about the property of the migrant—in his physical person—or the property of landlords and employers (and other market participants) who seek to contract with migrants.

Naturalization is something different altogether. Naturalization is the process by which persons gain access to political institutions. This requires an administrative act of a government agency. Citizenship can bring with it greater access to taxpayer-funded amenities like the welfare state, but the most crucial aspect of citizenship, in democratic states, is that citizenship provides access to the ballot box and to public office. Unlike immigration policy, naturalization policy does not involve the regulation or property.

Indeed, citizenship is not any type of property and there is, therefore, no natural right to citizenship. In the libertarian view of property, one can acquire property either through homesteading or through contract. Citizenship, in contrast, cannot be obtained through the same means of obtaining property. One cannot “homestead” citizenship or purchase it from the “owner” of citizenship in the private sector.

Moreover, property exists in nature regardless of the existence of civil governments or states.  Citizenship, however, does not exist independent of government institutions at all. Citizenship is fundamentally a creature of the state.

This important distinction between bona fide property and citizenship is clear in the real world, as demonstrated by the fact that, worldwide, many millions of immigrants are free to live and work in places where they are not citizens. In the United States, for example, countless non-citizens are free to own property, hold a job, and travel freely. It is not necessary to become a citizen to enjoy natural property rights or even to enjoy procedural rights such as due process rights for criminal trials. In other words, non-citizens can enjoy the same property rights that citizens enjoy.

Do Libertarians who Favor Expanded Naturalization Have an Argument other than “The Constitution Says So”? 

It is difficult to find articles by libertarian writers that even acknowledge these distinctions. Even fewer attempt to address it in any detail. The Mises Institute is a rare exception to this. Murray Rothbard provides some brief comments on the artificial nature of citizenship as a product of state power, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe has a few paragraphs on the topic. I have an article covering it here.

With the exception of a handful of Rothbardians, libertarians have been virtually silent when it comes to making a specifically libertarian case for or against naturalization. This has apparently been the case for quite a while since, back in 2012, Mark Krikorian of the Center for Immigration Studies publicly asked—not snarkily, but earnestly—if there is a libertarian position on citizenship at all.

At the same time, Krikorian did note that in exactly one case he had personally encountered a libertarian who acknowledged the difference between naturalization and immigration. According to Krikorian:

[T]he only time I recall a libertarian addressing the citizenship issue … was Jacob Hornberger of the Future of Freedom Foundation. During a panel we were both on Hornberger was challenged that immigrants would vote for socialism; he responded that immigration and citizenship are separate issues, and that immigrants shouldn’t necessarily be allowed to naturalize and vote …

Assuming this anecdote is true, Hornberger is correct on the matter. Like Rothbard, he also gets to the core and key issue of naturalization and citizenship: voting.

This voting issue was also acknowledged, very briefly, in an article by Sheldon Richman, in one of the rare cases where a libertarian has attempted to argue for expanded citizenship on libertarian grounds. Unfortunately, like most articles by libertarians ostensibly about citizenship, it’s mostly an article about immigration mixed in with a bit of legal positivism. However, near the end of the article, Richman admits that the article is really just advocating for immigration and he says “The case presented here might seem to justify no more than legal residency.” To remedy this, Richman provides exactly three sentences on the matter of naturalization. He writes:

What about citizenship? To take that step, one need only consider that a legal resident is subject to the government’s power to tax and regulate. Since his bid for exemption from U.S. government impositions would not be recognized, we are forced to the second-best disposition, namely, that the legal resident ought to have a say—as small as it is—over government policy, that is, the privileges and immunities of citizens.

This seems to be all we’re going to get from immigration expansionists on the topic of citizenship, and it is only a minor afterthought following 800 words of appeals to Constitutional authority. But, at least Richman has bothered to say something about the topic based on an appeal to some sort of presumably libertarian principle.

Every single other “libertarian” article on citizenship I have seen relies solely on legal arguments or, in some rare cases, appeals to the practical benefits of expanded citizenship. (Here’s one that says expanded naturalization is good because it helps “assimilate” immigrants, as if assimilation has something to do with libertarian goals.)

There are a couple of problems with Richman’s very short argument, though. First of all, Richman does not in any way establish that citizenship is a property right of any kind. As such, “protecting” this non-right of citizenship is not mandated by any libertarian principle. This is not necessarily a fatal problem. A libertarian argument could still reasonably advocate for more naturalization on the prudential and pragmatic grounds that expanded naturalization limits state power. That may be Richman’s tactic here.

Yet, it is not at all apparent that the extension of citizenship and naturalization have served to limit the size or scope of the state anywhere. Certainly, the example of expanded citizenship during the French Revolution points in exactly the opposite direction. Indeed, citizenship has historically been an important tool in building the modern centralized state.

Moreover, if expanded citizenship means an extended franchise—which it does in the modern West—then an argument in favor of expanded citizenship would rest on evidence that an expanded franchise has limited state power. It seems that exactly the opposite has happened. Indeed, it is probably not a coincidence that the total war and totalitarianism of the twentieth century closely followed the rise of the modern democratic state.

Richman tells us that citizenship and the vote is a means of residents protecting themselves from the excesses of government taxation and regulation. Yet, in the United States, an ever-expanding franchise has caused—or at least failed to prevent—a multi-fold increase in the burden of taxes and regulations.

It is likely that the early libertarians like the Levellers and John Locke—who opposed the idea of an unlimited franchise—were right all along. The reasons for this were put into a modern context by Ludwig von Mises who showed in 1944 that that once a sizable portion of the population becomes accustomed to demanding material benefits from the state, then the size of the state will only grow.

So, it appears that the expansion of naturalization and citizenship are not justified by any libertarian claim, whether rights-based or pragmatic. This may be part of why most libertarian pundits so often avoid the issue altogether.

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