Obviously, the Wolfowitz Doctrine fits hand and glove with American hegemony and its expansion. It provides a rationale for it that makes it sound both rational and a good thing. It provides a useful cover for a shift to militarism as opposed to diplomacy.
However, the Wolfowitz Doctrine has led to an over-expansion of the empire by identifying too many threats and by taking expansion of so-called American values and ways too far into the internal affairs of other countries. This lofty and overly-general Doctrine has provided much too broad guidance for American leaders, who by its ill-considered application failed to comprehend the all-important details on the ground, including their own limitations. Folly has resulted from America’s interventions.
Presently, the push into Russia’s backyard in Ukraine and the unrealistic demands being made concerning Crimea and Ukraine’s borders are harvesting more problems for the U.S., Europe and the world. Risks to the world order and stability have amplified because of this American-Russian confrontation. Europe as an entity in the form of the EU is caught in the middle as each country has its own best ways of dealing with Russia and as America calls one tune for all. Having to kowtow to the U.S. over Ukraine is not in the interests of major European players who might like to settle with Russia. This has become more difficult because of the U.S.’s policies.
The U.S. has raised the stakes in Ukraine far too high. Ukraine is now largely a vassal of the U.S., indebted to the West’s financial institutions, employing three American ministers in its cabinet, and having troops trained by American soldiers. The U.S. was behind the war launched by Ukraine against Donbass.
The U.S. commitment to Ukraine raises risks for the U.S. and world peace. This risk-raising is always a feature and outcome of applying the Wolfowitz Doctrine. Every intervention that the U.S. undertakes commits it to a new possibility of failure as well as success in which success never has a payoff as large as the costs of failure. This is because the benefits of threat reductions are continually over-estimated, inasmuch as the threats are over-estimated and the costs of control and winning are greatly under-estimated. And it is because the benefits of dominating some new region are over-estimated.
Ukraine is now as much a dilemma for the U.S. as it is for Russia. It is certainly a dilemma for each country in Europe.
Every intervention that grows out of the Wolfowitz Doctrine puts U.S. prestige and credibility into play and at risk. Each failure lowers the capacity of the U.S. to hold its empire together and to influence the decisions of other countries.
At some point, the U.S. must pull back or curtail expansion. At some point, several defeats or several crises or several failures to live up to its promises will undermine the entire structure built up by the U.S.
The U.S. now offers tenuous and very dangerous security guarantees over so many regions that it can’t possibly fulfill them all. It is like an insurance company that has written too many policies to too many bad risks.
For additional analysis of mine on the Wolfowitz Doctrine, actually the Cheney-Powell-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz doctrine, see here and here.
7:20 am on April 23, 2015
