The Sack of Rome: Elon Musk's Digital Coup

For a week, I’ve been savaged on X (which technologist Elon Musk, of course, co-owns), for urgently trying to warn people about what those few days in early February, 2025, when Elon Musk and five or six young engineers were alone with their devices plugged in to all our nation’s data, may represent. These few days represent a Rubicon that can never now be un-crossed, during which data and IP (intellectual property) captivation may have made Musk (and the people with whom he now allies) more powerful than any President, including more powerful than President Trump; more powerful than any nation-state, more powerful than the WEF and the WHO, more powerful than any prime minister, and more powerful than any other CEO or leader of any other set of corporations.

As thanks for my warnings, all with links and evidence, I’ve been called (on Musk’s X) a DNC shill, “controlled opposition”, “CIA,” a “libtard”, unpatriotic, and other epithets. I am not “controlled opposition”, “a DNC shill” or “CIA” and thankfully I am no longer a “libtard”; the former three claims are defamatory, while the latter is First- Amendment-protected speech. But since these are mostly bots and trolls (deployed by X’s algorithm), there is no one to sue. Technocracy: The Hard ... Wood, Patrick M. Best Price: $33.00 Buy New $24.59 (as of 03:55 UTC - Details)

Most genuine voices supportive of my efforts to warn the country, and Team Trump, I cannot see on X; an algorithm (controlled by Musk’s team) can do that – shadow-ban anyone, including anyone critical of Musk or of X.

So, like a weary would-be Paul Revere, though imagine him sans horse and almost sans a voice, I am taking to one of the last free speech platforms, to try to explain in non-techie language, for all US citizens; certainly for Team Trump — whose overall agenda I still support, if the coup by Silicon Valley can be un-f—-ed; for our elected representatives, and for the courts, none of whom speak the language of digital data — the layers of danger represented by the Sunday in February on which Musk and his engineers were alone with our records, with no real oversight and no secure firewalls.

You know me as a journalist and nonfiction writer and more recently, as an advocate against medical enslavement; but I am also CEO of a tech company, which I co-founded, called DailyClout.

It is successful. I worked with developers to build or improve three platforms, all based, like Musk’s DOGE targets, on government datasets: BillCam, which lets you see and share state and Federal bills; Communities, a surveillance- and censorship-free Facebook competitor; and Legisector.com, where you can access bills within your industry vertical.

I am not a coder. But from 13 years of working with our engineers and developers to build digital products based on government data, I understand the fundamentals of using government datasets, the protections around them, and the basics of IP and data security. I was also a political consultant to President Clinton’s team, and to Vice President Al Gore.

So, using both hats — digital and political — I see appalling red flags. I cannot believe that Team Trump understands these dangers fully, or even that the Republicans in Congress do; if they did, they would not make themselves, their base, and their donors, so vulnerable.

What Actually Happened on Sunday, Feb 2, 2025?

Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury, went into an interview after the Feb 2 breach, to assure Americans that their data were safe. He explained that Musk’s and the engineers’ access to six trillion dollars in Treasury data was “read only.” That interview reassured many people.

It did not reassure me.

“Read only” does not just mean a human being reading. It can also mean copying, and machine reading. The copied data may be stored in less secure locations or used for purposes that are not originally intended or authorized. That is why cybersecurity frameworks emphasize that access controls must be part of a larger set of controls (including monitoring, encryption, and endpoint security) to truly safeguard sensitive information.

So now, realize what Musk can have taken home.

More red flags involve who was with Musk, how he or she worked, and what is his or her expertise. News reports confirmed that with the Musk team was Tom Krause, CEO of Cloud Software Group. Krause is still CEO of that company, though he is also with DOGE.

As CEO of a cloud computing company, Krause’s allegiance is to maximize value for his shareholders. There is no way for a current CEO of a company to serve DOGE without an illegal conflict of interest.

Musk, for his part, is still CEO of six companies. Their investors can sue him if he does not use every opportunity, to enhance the value of the companies in which they have invested. We do not know what NDAs (non-disclosure agreements), non-competes (agreements that one will not use information accessed to compete), if any, Krause, Musk, or their engineers, have signed, or what conflict investigations they have undergone.

President Trump says there is no conflict:

“President Donald Trump said on Monday that the White House will ensure Musk does not go too far and that the White House has the ultimate say in decision-making. “Elon can’t do and won’t do anything without our approval, and we’ll give him the approval, where appropriate; where not appropriate, we won’t. But he reports in.” Trump explained.

“If there’s a conflict, then we won’t let him get near it,” he said.”

But is this possible for President Trump to know? The data troves involved are so vast, and the obligations by Krause and Musk to their own investors in multiple companies so substantial and legally binding, that as a CEO myself, I do not understand how President Trump can know that there is no conflict.

Also — look at who accompanied Musk.

If Musk’s role were simply to read the datasets and to propose cuts to the President, — a reasonable, even productive role for an advisor with Musk’s skills – why did he need a cloud computing guy, and engineers, with him?

Cloud computing CEOs store things; they store vast numbers of things. That is their job. What can hold all of that data, our data, if it is copied?

It takes a “cloud” of one’s own.

Engineers build and change things.

Why did Musk not simply need a team of analysts, and a stenographer, if he were to lawfully propose cuts to the President?

With a secure human-only read, protected by NDAs, non-competes, background checks, ideally with recusals from their other companies as well, and the basic cybersecurity guardrails itemized above, these DOGE could have given President Trump the same wonderful headlines about ferreting out corruption and waste he is getting now — but without our risking anything; let alone, without our risking everything.

But Team Musk chose not to do it that way – the clean way.

Team Musk did it like this instead: they looked at everything; not all of them had top-level clearances; and, according to reports, some of the engineers plugged their own devices into the systems. One of them, a teenager, turned out to have leaked internal proprietary data, in his last role, an internship.

These are the kinds of horrific breaches of cybersecurity that makes cybersecurity experts turn white:

“Musk and his team of young, inexperienced engineers — at least one of whom is not a US citizen — have taken a number of publicly known steps that raise serious concerns among cybersecurity and privacy professionals.” This cybersecurity site went on to explain other hazards caused by Team Musk’s access. CSOonline.com is a site that is devoted to security and cybersecurity industry news. It is not partisan. And its evaluation of what Musk did, is horrified:

“These actions violate several fundamental security principles, experts contend, potentially exposing highly sensitive US government systems to malware while opening new possible avenues of attacks by cybercriminals and even nation-state adversaries. […] In addition, over the past week, workers at the Technology Transformation Services (TTS), housed within the General Services Administration (GSA), were summoned into meetings to discuss their code and projects with Musk’s team members. TTS helps develop the platforms and tools that underpin many government services, including analytics tools and API plugins that agencies can use to deploy tech faster. Thomas Shedd, who used to work for Musk’s Tesla, is now the head of TTS. Some DOGE workers had yet to receive a GSA laptop, indicating that some connected to government systems using their own devices.” [Italics mine].

In the world of digital technology, code is protected to the death. These workers could have been asked by Team Musk to demonstrate their coding skills. Or they could have been asked questions about how they built their code, or even been asked for the code itself, which valuable IP (intellectual property) we, the taxpayers, built and own. January 6: How Democra... Kelly, Julie Best Price: $27.08 Buy New $19.00 (as of 02:31 UTC - Details)

If it was the latter, DOGE’s visits may turn out to have been a massive theft.

By scooping up platforms and code, Team Musk may have siphoned for unknown others, or for Musk’s other interests, the value of millions or billions of dollars of taxpayer money spent on developing the tech and IP that run our many government systems.

And what else was done digitally to our systems?

Treasury Secretary Bessent, having been told no doubt that the access of the DOGE team was “read only,” announced that to the public.

Wired later reported in a piece, sent to me by economist Catherine Austin Fitts, a former President George Bush I HUD official who had accomplished DOGE-style waste and fraud excision; who identified that only one actuary oversaw a $300 billion investment portfolio, and was later tasked by HUD with managing its $500 billion investment portfolio — that in fact the Musk team’s access had included “write” privileges.

So the DOGE team can have both copied and altered our datasets and records.

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