Twin
Demons
by
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
This
talk was delivered at the Mises
Circle in New York City on September 14, 2012.
The twentieth
century was the century of total war. Limitations on the scope of
war, built up over many centuries, had already begun to break down
in the nineteenth century, but they were altogether obliterated
in the twentieth. And of course the sheer amount of resources that
centralized states could bring to bear in war, and the terrible
new technologies of killing that became available to them, made
the twentieth a century of almost unimaginable horror.
It isn’t terribly
often that people discuss the development of total war in tandem
with the development of modern central banking, which – although
antecedents existed long before – also came into its own in the
twentieth century. It’s no surprise that Ron Paul, the man in public
life who has done more than anyone to break through the limits of
what is permissible to say in polite society about both these things,
has also been so insistent that the twin phenomena of war and central
banking are linked. "It is no coincidence," Dr. Paul said,
"that the century of total war coincided with the century of
central banking."
He added:
If every
American taxpayer had to submit an extra five or ten thousand
dollars to the IRS this April to pay for the war, I'm quite certain
it would end very quickly. The problem is that government finances
war by borrowing and printing money, rather than presenting a
bill directly in the form of higher taxes. When the costs are
obscured, the question of whether any war is worth it becomes
distorted.
For the sake
of my remarks today I take it as given that Murray Rothbard’s analysis
of the true functions of central banking is correct. Rothbard’s
books The
History of Money and Banking: The Colonial Era Through World War
II, The
Case Against the Fed, The
Mystery of Banking, and What
Has Government Done to Our Money? provide the logical case
and the empirical evidence for this view, and I refer you to those
sources for additional details.
For now I take
it as uncontroversial that central banks perform three significant
functions for the banking system and the government. First, they
serve as lenders of last resort, which in practice means bailouts
for the big financial firms. Second, they coordinate the inflation
of the money supply by establishing a uniform rate at which the
banks inflate, thereby making the fractional-reserve banking system
less unstable and more consistently profitable than it would be
without a central bank (which, by the way, is why the banks themselves
always clamor for a central bank). Finally, they allow governments,
via inflation, to finance their operations far more cheaply and
surreptitiously than they otherwise could.
As an enabler
of inflation, the Fed is ipso facto an enabler of war. Looking back
on World War I, Ludwig von Mises wrote in 1919: "One can say
without exaggeration that inflation is an indispensable means of
militarism. Without it, the repercussions of war on welfare become
obvious much more quickly and penetratingly; war weariness would
set in much earlier."
No government
has ever said, "Because we want to go to war, we must abandon
central banking," or "Because we want to go to war, we
must abandon inflation and the fiat money system." Governments
always say, "We must abandon the gold standard because we want
to go to war." That alone indicates the restraint that hard
money places on governments. Precious metals cannot be created out
of thin air, which is why governments chafe at monetary systems
based on them.
Governments
can raise revenue in three ways. Taxation is the most visible means
of doing so, and it eventually meets with popular resistance. They
can borrow the money they need, but this borrowing is likewise visible
to the public in the form of higher interest rates – as the federal
government competes for a limited amount of available credit, credit
becomes scarcer for other borrowers.
Creating money
out of thin air, the third option, is preferable for governments,
since the process by which the political class siphons resources
from society via inflation is far less direct and obvious than in
the cases of taxation and borrowing. In the old days the kings clipped
the coins, kept the shavings, then spent the coins back into circulation
with the same nominal value. Once they have it, governments guard
this power jealously. Mises once said that if the Bank of England
had been available to King Charles I during the English Civil War
of the 1640s, he could have crushed the parliamentary forces arrayed
against him, and English history would have been much different.
Juan de Mariana,
a Spanish Jesuit who wrote in the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, is best known in political philosophy for having defended
regicide in his 1599 work De Rege. Casual students often
assume that it must have been for this provocative claim that the
Spanish government confined him for a time. But in fact it was his
Treatise
on the Alteration of Money, which condemned monetary inflation
as a moral evil, that got him in trouble.
Think about
that. Saying the king could be killed was one thing. But taking
direct aim at inflation, the lifeblood of the regime? Now that was
taking things too far.
In those days,
if a war were to be funded partly by monetary debasement, the process
was direct and not difficult to understand. The sequence of events
today is more complicated, but as I’ve said, not fundamentally different.
What happens today is not that the government needs to pay for a
war, comes up short, and simply prints the money to make up the
difference. The process is not quite so crude. But when we examine
it carefully, it turns out to be essentially the same thing.
Central banks,
established by the world’s governments, allow those governments
to spend more than they receive in taxes. Borrowing allowed them
to spend more than they received in taxes, but government borrowing
led to higher interest rates, which in turn can provoke the public
in undesirable ways. When central banks create money and inject
it into the banking system, they serve the purposes of governments
by pushing those interest rates back down, thereby concealing the
effects of government borrowing.
But central
banking does more than this. It essentially prints up money and
hands it to the government, though not quite so directly and obviously.
First, the
federal government is able to sell its bonds at artificially high
prices (and correspondingly low interest rates) because the buyers
of its debt know they can turn around and sell to the Federal Reserve.
It’s true that the federal government has to pay interest on the
securities the Federal Reserve owns, but at the end of the year
the Fed pays that money back to the Treasury, minus its trivial
operating expenses. That takes care of the interest. And in case
you’re thinking that the federal government still has to pay out
at least the principal, it really doesn’t. The government can roll
over its existing debt when it comes due, issuing a new bond to
pay off the principal of the old one.
Through this
convoluted process – a process, not coincidentally, that the general
public is unlikely to know about or understand – the federal government
is in fact able to do the equivalent of printing money and spending
it. While everyone else has to acquire resources by spending money
they earned in a productive enterprise – in other words, they first
have to produce something for society, and then they may consume
– government may acquire resources without first having produced
anything. Money creation via government monopoly thus becomes another
mechanism whereby the exploitative relationship between government
and the public is perpetuated.
Now because
the central bank allows the government to conceal the cost of everything
it does, it provides an incentive for governments to engage in additional
spending in all kinds of areas, not just war. But because war is
enormously expensive and because the sacrifices that accompany it
place such a strain on the public, it is wartime expenditures for
which the assistance of the central bank is especially welcome for
any government.
The Federal
Reserve System, which was established in late 1913 and opened its
doors the following year, was first put to the test during World
War I. Unlike some countries, the U.S. did not abandon the gold
standard during the war, but it was not operating under a pure 100-percent
gold standard in any case. The Fed could and did engage in credit
expansion. On Mises.org we feature
an article by John Paul Koning that takes the reader through
the exact process by which the Fed carried out its monetary inflation
in those early years. In brief, the Fed essentially created money
and used it to add war bonds to its balance sheet. Benjamin Anderson,
the Austrian-sympathetic economist, observed at the time, "The
growth in virtually all the items of the balance sheet of the Federal
Reserve System since the United States entered the war has been
very great indeed."
The Fed’s accommodating
role was not confined to wartime itself. In America’s
Money Machine, Elgin Groseclose wrote: "Although the
war was over in 1918, in a fighting sense, it was not over in a
financial sense. The Treasury still had enormous obligations to
meet, which were eventually covered by a Victory loan. The main
support in the market again was the Federal Reserve."
Monetary expansion
was especially helpful to the U.S. government during the Vietnam
War. Lyndon Johnson could have both his Great Society programs and
his overseas war, and the strain on the public was kept – at first,
at least – within manageable limits.
So confident
had the Keynesian economic planners become that by 1970, Arthur
Okun, one of the decade’s key presidential advisers on the economy,
was noting in a published retrospective that wise economic management
seemed to have done away with the business cycle. But reality could
not be evaded forever, and the apparently strong war economy of
the 1960s gave way to the stagnation of the 1970s.
There is a
law of the universe according to which every time the public is
promised that the boom-bust business cycle has been banished forever,
a bust is right around the corner. One month after Okun’s rosy book
was published, the recession began.
Americans paid
a steep cost for the inflation of the 1960s. The loss of life resulting
from the war itself was the most gruesome and horrific of these
costs, but the economic devastation cannot be ignored. As many of
us well remember, years of unemployment and high inflation plagued
the U.S. economy. The stock market fared even worse. Mark Thornton
points out that
in May 1970,
a portfolio consisting of one share of every stock listed on the
Big Board was worth just about half of what it would have been
worth at the start of 1969. The high flyers that had led the market
of 1967 and 1968 – conglomerates, computer leasers, far-out electronics
companies, franchisers – were precipitously down from their peaks.
Nor were they down 25 percent, like the Dow, but 80, 90, or 95
percent.
...The Dow
index shows that stocks tended to trade in a wide channel for
much of the period between 1965 and 1984. However, if you adjust
the value of stocks by price inflation as measured by the Consumer
Price Index, a clearer and more disturbing picture emerges. The
inflation-adjusted or real purchasing power measure of the Dow
indicates that it lost nearly 80% of its peak value.
And for all
the talk of the Fed’s alleged independence, it is not even possible
to imagine the Fed maintaining a tight-money stance when the regime
demands stimulus, or when the troops are in the field. It has been
more than accommodating during the so-called War on Terror. Consider
the amount of debt purchased every year by the Fed, and compare
it to that year’s war expenditures, and you will get a sense of
the Fed’s enabling role.
Now while it’s
true that a gold standard restrains governments, it’s also true
that governments have little difficulty finding pretexts – war chief
among them – to abandon the gold standard. For that reason, the
gold standard in and of itself is not a sufficient restraint on
the government’s ambitions, at home and abroad.
As we look
to the future, we must cast aside all timidity in our proposals
for monetary reform. We do not seek a gold-exchange standard, as
existed under the Bretton Woods system. We do not seek to use the
price of gold as a calibration device to assist the monetary authority
in its decisions on how much money to create. We do not even seek
the restoration of the classical gold standard, great though its
merits are.
In the 1830s,
the hard-money Jacksonian monetary theorists coined the marvelous
phrase "separation of bank and state." That would be a
start.
What we need
today is the separation of money and state.
There are some
ways in which money is unique among goods. For one thing, money
is valued not for its own sake but for its use in exchange. For
another, money is not consumed, but rather is handed on from one
person to another. And all other goods in the economy have their
prices expressed in terms of this good.
But there is
nothing about money – or anything else, for that matter – that should
make us think its production must be carried out by the government
or its designated monopoly grantee. Money constitutes one-half of
every non-barter market transaction. People who believe in the market
economy, and yet who are prepared to hand over to the state the
custodianship of this most crucial good, ought to think again.
Interventionists
sometimes claim that a particular good is just too important to
be left to the market. The standard free-market reply turns this
argument around: the more important a commodity is, the more essential
it is for the government not to produce it, and to leave its production
to the market instead.
Nowhere is
this more true than in the case of money. As Ludwig von Mises once
said, the history of money is the history of government efforts
to destroy money. Government control of money has yielded monetary
debasement, the impoverishment of society relative to the state,
devastating business cycles, financial bubbles, capital consumption
(because of falsified profit-and-loss accounting), moral hazard,
and – most germane to my topic today – the expropriation of the
public in ways they are unlikely to understand. It is this silent
expropriation that has made possible some of the state’s greatest
enormities, including its wars, and it is all of these offenses
combined that constitute a compelling popular brief against the
current system and in favor of a market substitute.
The war machine
and the money machine, in short, are intimately linked. It is vain
to denounce the moral grotesqueries of the U.S. empire without at
the same time taking aim at the indispensable support that makes
it all possible. If we wish to oppose the state and all its manifestations
– its imperial adventures, its domestic subsidies, its unstoppable
spending and debt accumulation – we must point to their source,
the central bank, the mechanism that the state and its kept media
and economists will defend to their dying days.
The state has
persuaded the people that its own interests are identical with theirs.
It seeks to promote their welfare. Its wars are their wars. It is
the great benefactor, and the people are to be content in their
role as its contented subjects.
Ours is a different
view. The state’s relationship to the people is not benign, it is
not one of magnanimous giver and grateful recipient. It is an exploitative
relationship, whereby an array of self-perpetuating fiefdoms that
produce nothing live at the expense of the toiling majority. Its
wars do not protect the public; they fleece it. Its subsidies do
not promote the so-called public good; they undermine it. Why should
we expect its production of money to be an exception to this general
pattern?
As
F.A. Hayek said, it is not reasonable to think that the state has
any interest in giving us a "good money." What the state
wants is to produce the money or have a privileged position vis-à-vis
the source of the money, so it can dispense largesse to its favored
constituencies. We should not be anxious to accommodate it.
The state does
not compromise, and neither should we. In the struggle of liberty
against power, few enough will oppose the state and the conventional
wisdom it urges us to adopt. Fewer still will reject the state and
its programs root and branch. We must be those few, as we work toward
a future in which we are the many.
This is our
mission today, as it has been the mission of the Mises Institute
for the past 30 years. With your support, we shall at this critical
moment carry on publishing our books and periodicals, aiding research
and teaching in Austrian economics, promoting the Austrian School
to the public, and training tomorrow’s champions of the economics
of freedom.
September
17, 2012
Llewellyn
H. Rockwell, Jr. [send him
mail], former editorial assistant to Ludwig von Mises and congressional
chief of staff to Ron Paul, is founder and chairman of the Mises
Institute, literary executor for the estate of Murray N. Rothbard,
and editor of LewRockwell.com.
See his
books.
Copyright
© 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided
full credit is given.
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