Withholding
Consent From the Khan
by
Peter
C. Earle
People all
over the world in the United States, the eurozone, Asia,
Africa, the Middle East, and everywhere in between are now
inescapably facing the consequences of a century of unmitigated
fiat-currency expansion. In response, a global movement has risen
to search for solutions to the central-bank-engineered deterioration
of standards of living, purchasing power, employment prospects,
and economic health in general.
In the United
States, this pursuit is embodied by two superficially different
though both hopelessly naive and economically underinformed
political movements: the numerous Occupy groups and the
so-called Tea Party. But both factions ultimately kowtow before
the state, worshiping either its welfare or warfare.
Is activism
that appeals directly to the political class and central bankers
the individuals who are directly responsible for the current
economic morass a logical course of action? A review of
history reveals some alternatives; what follows is one of them.
Beginning in
1206, Mongol invaders swept west and east from central Asia to become
the largest contiguous empire in the history of the world. As it
expanded, the conquered territories were administratively partitioned
into subkingdoms where the Khan's rulings could be enforced in accordance
with local political and cultural flavors. One such subkingdom was
the Ilkhanate, which covered portions of modern Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Turkey, and Afghanistan, and had as its seat of power the city of
Tabriz.
In 1291, Rinchindorji
Gaikathu, a former governor of Anatolia, took the throne of the
Ilkhanate. Like most politicians, Gaikathu was a reckless spendthrift
and wasted no time finding numerous causes on which to squander
the treasury in his effort to consolidate power. He gave generously
to the Nestorian Christian sect, which was struggling against Zoroastrian
oppression throughout portions of modern-day Iraq, perhaps investing
in hope of their assistance with another project: a planned, but
never-undertaken, seizure of Baghdad.[1]
But most of all, Gaikathu was known for his colossal expenditures
on personal extravagance and debauchery.[2]
And so it was that, by 1294, the Ilkhanate's coffers were drained
and its treasury on the brink of bankruptcy.
Ordinarily
again, like most politicians Gaikathu would simply
have imposed a crushing raft of taxes, tithing, and fees on the
populace in order to extort funds; a coincident "cattle plague,"
however, thwarted the standard confiscatory tactics of the state.[3]
In a panic, he attempted to raise funds by selling bonds in Baghdad
and Shiraz. But an ancient and time-honored credit agency
reputation confounded his efforts, leaving the vast territory
entrusted to him even closer to financial ruin.[4]
Thus, Gaikathu
sought after schemes to recapitalize the emptied vaults of the Ilkhanate.
Amid what one
can only imagine as desperate huddling across his court, a treasury
official, Izzuddin Muzaffar, came forward to describe a Chinese
experiment embarked on 20 years earlier involving parchment made
from the bark of mulberry trees: a method by which a paper currency
was created and could allegedly be printed as limitlessly as projects
or desires demanded.[5]
Heartened by
this account and not wanting to waste a moment, Gaikathu swung into
action: he summoned Kublai Khan's ambassador for direct consultation.
First, a network of stations were set up and staffed to both house
block-printing facilities and serve as metallic-coin-collection
points. Gold- and silversmiths were ordered to immediately close
down.[6] Then,
the new paper currency was designed, displaying both Chinese markings
(to confer credibility) and Islamic regalia (a sop to local sensitivities).
Also stamped
on the new bills was a promise that with its issuance, "poverty
[would] vanish, provisions [would] become cheap, and rich and poor
[would] be equal."[7]
Gaikathu's
machinations dwarfed those of his Chinese predecessors, though.
His plan to alleviate insolvency evolved beyond merely replenishing
the treasury into a
scheme ...
not [only] to aid the existing circulation, but to suppress and
supersede altogether the use of gold and silver money ...
the object being that all the precious metals in the land might
be monopolized by the ruling power.[8]
Whereas two
decades earlier the Chinese had merely augmented their precious-metal
coinage with paper, Gaikathu's goal was to replace the entire outstanding
stock of metallic currency in the Ilkhanate with a paper currency
dubbed the chao.[9]
Finally, a
series of decrees were broadcast by criers throughout the streets
of Tabriz. The first prohibited the use of any metal currency whatsoever:
consumers, producers, and middlemen were ordered to transact exclusively
in the nascent medium thereafter. At the same time, it was now required
that all citizens turn in their metallic coins in exchange for the
new paper issue. Knowing, of course, that individuals are instinctively
(and wisely) unwilling to trade known, proven money for a newly
created, untried medium, the penalty for failure to comply was death.
(Foreign merchants, too, were required to exchange their coins for
the new money at the border of the Ilkhanate.) Greater penalties,
however, were reserved for anyone caught defacing or interfering
in the issuance of the paper currency. For this there was not only
a death sentence but also death for the wrongdoer's entire family,
along with complete confiscation of property.[10]
Edward Thomas
summarizes:
[Gaikathu's]
motives were obviously evil ... instead of bringing a benefit,
in disguise, it was manifestly fraudulent at its inception, associated
with tyranny and oppression in enforcement of its provisions.[11]
All of this
was accompanied by a propaganda campaign; signs throughout the kingdom
proclaimed,
If in the
world this chao gains currency,
Immortal
shall the Empire's glory be.[12]
Tabriz was
the testing ground for the chao. And, for the first few days after
the publication of Gaikathu's commands and dissemination of the
new currency, citizens briefly protested and a few riots erupted.
The businessmen, artisans, traders, and peasants of the Mongol territory
may have been commoners, but they were far from simple; reacting
to the missives, they "fell into a sea of thought and astonishment
... to write down all the discussions the notes gave origin to would
be impossible."[13]
And then, everything
went silent.
Rather than
utilize the suspicious paper chits, Tabrizians either fled the city
or remained and subsisted on emergency food stores, sometimes raiding
the gardens of neighbors who had left. Merchants refused to transact
or trade; tents in bazaars stood empty. In just a few days, the
formerly vibrant streets and markets of Tabriz became a commerceless
"wilderness."[14]
Black markets sprang up: hushed, hurried transactions in the dead
of night.[15]
The result was precisely the economic collapse that Gaikathu had
sought to stave off, quite literally overnight, and the effects
were far-reaching as well: Persian polymath Rashīd al-Dīn
Tabīb wrote of this episode as having brought about the "ruin
of Basra," 850 miles away.[16]
Backpedaling,
Gaikathu and his advisers responded by first permitting limited
transactions in specie again, and shortly thereafter abandoned the
paper-currency initiative altogether. Tabrizians, however, were
rendered quite humorless by the whole exercise, and even with the
restoration of the metallic standard and the economy on the mend,
"[Muzaffar, the treasury official] was torn to pieces by the mob
[and Gaikathu] deposed and put to death by a confederacy of his
nobles" some months later.[17]
The people's
hunch, of course, was uncanny:
The paper
money immediately became a depreciated medium of exchange ...
in some districts ... a horse worth 15 dinars was sold for
150. All caravan traffic ceased.[18]
The experience
left an indelible imprint on the cultural and institutional memory
of Persians for generations to follow; writing of this event during
the closing days of World War I, William Frederick Spalding wrote,
The lesson
received was a salutary one and, as far as can be ascertained,
successive [Persian] Governments have never seriously reconsidered
the re-introduction of paper issues under their own auspices.[19]
Rather than
agitating for yet another round of inept monetary or fiscal intervention
or engaging in overwrought, inane protests, Persians individually
albeit en masse turned their back on their
government's manufactured expedient. To oppose what was essentially
an archaic version of quantitative easing, the citizens of Tabriz
responded with a socially imposed countermeasure fundamentally amounting
to qualitative tightening.
While it is
a positive step that, for the first time in nearly a century, people
around the world are examining the foundations of central banking
and skeptically regarding the long-and-widely-held conflation of
currency (a transactional medium) with money (a store of value),
any hope for reform must dim when the debate is channeled into the
culpable, ineffectual hands of political actors.
Writing in
1550, French judge and writer Etienne de la Boetie advised that
those seeking liberty
resolve to
serve no more, and ... are at once freed. I do not ask that
you place hands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply
that you support him no longer; then you will behold him, like
a great Colossus whose pedestal has been pulled away, fall of
his own weight and break into pieces.[20]
The Persians
of Tabriz, the seat of power in the Ilkhanate, brought sanity and
balance back to their lives simply by turning their backs on Gaikathu's
perfidious tender. They did so without petitions, elections, bloviating,
referenda, histrionic "demonstrations," political assassinations,
or a bloody, wasteful revolution. The simple act of abandoning the
contrived currency system exposed it and indeed, the issuing
regime itself for what they were: coercively imposed, larcenous
fictions.
Notes
[1]
Arabic historian Aḥmad ibnʻAlī Maqrīzīindicates
that Gaikathu, in addition to plotting a military campaign to
seize Baghdad, had additionally engaged in a war of words with
Egyptian Mamluk Sultan Al-Ashraf Khalil, threatening to invade
and conquer the Levant.
[2]
Edward Granville Browne, A
History of Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1920), p. 37.
[3]
David Morgan, The
Mongols (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1986), p. 165.
[4]
William F. Spalding, Eastern
Exchange Currency and Finance (London: Sir Isaac Pitman
and Sons, 1917), p. 97.
[5]
Henry V. Poor, Resumption
and the Silver Question (New York: H.V. and H.W. Poor,
1878), p. 140.
[6]
Ibid, p. 145.
[7]
Daniel J. Boorstin, The
Discoverers (New York: Random House, 1983), p. 503.
[8]
Edward Thomas, The
Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi (London: Trubner
& Co, 1871), p. 242.
[9]
Poor, 145.
[10]
Pringle Kennedy, A
History of the Great Moghuls; or, A History of the Badshahate
of Delhi (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co, 1905), p.
51.
[11]
Thomas, p. 240241.
[12]
Browne, 38.
[13]
Journal of the Institute of Bankers, Vol. 13 (London: Blades,
East & Blades, 1892), p. 25.[14] Journal of the Institute
of Bankers.
[15]
A most humorous and illuminating passage from Spalding relates
that immediately following issuance of the chao and the
desertion of Tabriz, footpads took to preying on citizens with
real, hard assets; and with a great sense of sarcasm, they didn't
leave the victim empty-handed: they "paid" for what was stolen
with the new, fiat paper!
[16]
Jaquir Iqbal, Islamic Financial Management (Delhi: Global
Village Publishing House, 2009), p. 154.
[17]
George N. Curzon, Persia
and the Persian Question (London: Longmans, Green &
Co, 1892), p. 478.
[18]
Spalding, 97.
[19]
Spalding, 98.
[20]
Etienne de la Boetie, The
Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude
(Auburn: Ludwig Von Mises Institute, 2008), p. 47.
Reprinted
from Mises.org.
February
7, 2012
Peter
C. Earle [send
him mail] is the CEO, founder, and head trader of FINAGEM, LLC.

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