Government Default: Yes or No?
by
Gary North
Tea Party Economist
Recently
by Gary North: The
Violence of Chicago’s Teachers
It is not
often that readers get a clear-cut choice between two forecasts.
Most forecasts have wiggle room. Not the following.
1.
The United States government will default.
2. The United States government will not default.
I hold the
first position. John T. Harvey holds the second. He wrote a piece
for Forbes defending his position: "It
Is Impossible For The US To Default".
I regard this
as the most fundamental economic issue facing the U.S. government.
I regard it as the most fundamental economic issue facing Americans
under age 60.
Mr. Harvey
begins.
With
so many economic, political, and social problems facing us today,
there is little point in focusing attention on something that is
not one. The false fear of which I speak is the chance of US debt
default. There is no need to speculate on what that likelihood is,
I can give you the exact number: there is 0% chance that the US
will be forced to default on the debt.
That is the
kind of forthrightness that I appreciate. Here is my response. With
so many economic, political, and social problems facing us today,
it is crucial that we focus attention on something that is both
catastrophic and inescapable. The fear of which I speak is the chance
of U.S. debt default. There is no need to speculate on what that
likelihood is, I can give you the exact number: there is 100% chance
that the U.S. will be forced to default on the debt.
UNFUNDED
LIABILITIES
Why do I believe
this? Because I believe in the analysis supplied by Professor Lawrence
Kotlikoff of Boston University. Each year, he analyzes the statistics
produced by the Congressional Budget Office on the present value
not future value of the unfunded liabilities of the
U.S. government. The
latest figures are up by $11 trillion over the last year. The
figure today is $222 trillion.
This means
that the government needs $222 trillion to invest in private capital
markets that will pay about 5% per year for the next 75 years.
Problem: the
world's capital markets are just about $222 trillion. Then there
are the unfunded liabilities of all other Western nations. These
total at least what the U.S. does, and probably far more, since
the welfare state's promises are more comprehensive outside the
USA.
Conclusion:
they will all default.
Mr. Harvey
thinks that the U.S. government could choose to default, but it
won't.
We
could choose to do so, just as a person trapped in a warehouse full
of food could choose to starve, but we could never be forced to.
This is not a theory or conjecture, it is cold, hard fact. The reason
the US could never be forced to default is that every single bit
of the debt is owed in the currency that we and only we can issue:
dollars. Unlike Greece, we don't have to try to earn foreign exchange
via exports or beg for better terms. There is simply no level of
debt we could not repay with a keystroke.
There are
a lot of people inside the camp of the gold bugs who also believe
this. They are probably wrong. They are wrong for the same reason
why Mr. Harvey is wrong. They do not understand Ludwig von Mises.
MISES
ON THE CRACK-UP BOOM
Mises was
a senior advisor to the equivalent of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce
after World War I. He understood monetary theory. His book on money,
The
Theory of Money and Credit, had been published in 1912,
two years before the war broke out.
In the post-War
edition of his book, he wrote of the process of the hyperinflationary
breakdown of a currency. He made it clear that such a currency is
short-lived. People shift to rival currencies.
The
emancipation of commerce from a money which is proving more and
more useless in this way begins with the expulsion of the money
from hoards. People begin at first to hoard other money instead
so as to have marketable goods at their disposal for unforeseen
future needs - perhaps precious-metal money and foreign notes, and
sometimes also domestic notes of other kinds which have a higher
value because they cannot be increased by the State '(e.g.the Romanoff
rouble in Russia or the 'blue' money of communist Hungary); then
ingots, precious stones, and pearls; even pictures, other objects
of art, and postage stamps. A further step is the adoption of foreign
currency or metallic money (i.e. for all practical purposes, gold)
in credit transactions. Finally, when the domestic currency ceases
to be used in retail trade, wages as well have to be paid in some
other way than in pieces of paper which are then no longer good
for anything.
The collapse of an inflation policy carried to its extreme - as
in the United States in 1781 and in France in 1796 does not destroy
the monetary system, but only the credit money or fiat money of
the State that has overestimated the effectiveness of its own policy.
The collapse emancipates commerce from etatism and establishes metallic
money again (pp. 229-30).
In 1949, his
book Human
Action appeared. In it, he discussed hyperinflation. He
called this phase of the business cycle the crack-up boom.
The
characteristic mark of the phenomenon is that the increase in the
quantity of money causes a fall in the demand for money. The tendency
toward a fall in purchasing power as generated by the increased
supply of money is intensified by the general propensity to restrict
cash holdings which it brings about. Eventually a point is reached
where the prices at which people would be prepared to part with
"real" goods discount to such an extent the expected progress in
the fall of purchasing power that nobody has a sufficient amount
of cash at hand to pay them. The monetary system breaks down; all
transactions in the money concerned cease; a panic makes its purchasing
power vanish altogether. People return either to barter or to the
use of another kind of money (p. 424).
Later in the
book, Mises discussed the policy of devaluation: the expansion of
the domestic money supply in a fruitless attempt to reduce the international
value of the currency unit.
If
the government does not care how far foreign exchange rates may
rise, it can for some time continue to cling to credit expansion.
But one day the crack-up boom will annihilate its monetary system.
On the other hand, if the authority wants to avoid the necessity
of devaluing again and again at an accelerated pace, it must arrange
its domestic credit policy in such a way as not to outrun in credit
expansion the other countries against which it wants to keep its
domestic currency at par (p. 791).
Mt. Harvey has
described just such a policy. He concluded that the United States
government can never go bankrupt. It can print its way out of every
obligation.
No, it can't.
HYPERINFLATIONARY
COLLAPSE
The expansion
of the monetary base can go on until such time as commercial banks
monetize all of the reserves on their books. Prices then rise to
such levels that transactions no longer take place in the official
currency unit. The division of labor contracts. The output of capital
and labor falls. At some point, people adopt other currency units.
They no longer cooperate with each other by means of the hyperinflated
currency.
Professor
Steve Hanke has co-authored an
article on the worst 56 hypernflations. He discovered that most
of these in industrial nations were over in a couple of years. The
crack-up boom ended them.
No nation
can long pursue a policy of hyperinflation. It destroys the currency
and destroys the division of labor. The result is starvation. The
policy of hyperinflation ends before this phase. Members of society
shift to other forms of money.
This is why
the policy of hyperinflation is useless in dealing with the 75-year
obligations of the federal government to support old people through
Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and federal pensions. These
obligations are inter-generational. Hyperinflation lasts for months,
not decades. When the government ends its policy of hyperinflation,
it finds that it is still saddled with these obligations.
If the Federal
Reserve resorts to hyperinflation, its retirement portfolio will
reach zero value unless it shifts to foreign currencies, gold, or
other hyperinflation hedges. It will publicly announce that the
U.S. dollar is a failed currency, as manipulated by the FED.
If it refuses,
then it will oversee Great Depression 2, monetary deflation, and
the contraction of the division of labor. The U.S. government will
go bankrupt.
If Congress
nationalizes the FED, then it will pursue hyperinflation. The crack-up
boom will end the experiment.
At that point,
all of the obligations to retirees will still remain. But the government
will not have the money to pay them. The $222 trillion of present
valued unfunded liabilities will still remain unfunded.
The government's
obligations are inter-generational. Hyperinflation is not. The latter
in no fundamental way reduces the former.
This means
that the government will default. This is 100% guaranteed.
CITING
ECONOMIC EXPERTS
Mr. Harvey
cites the experts. "Don't take my word for it. Here are just a few
folks from across the political spectrum and in different walks
of life saying the same thing." Then he gives a series of quotations
from these men: Alan Greenspan, Peter Zeihan, Erwan Mahe, Mike Norman,
Monty Agarwal, L. Randall Wray. Other than Mr. Greenspan, I had
heard of none of them. He concludes:
Mind
you, that doesn't mean there might not be other economic or political
consequences. Inflation and currency depreciation, for example,
are possibilities.
Yes, they
surely are, since they are the same thing. But they do not solve
the problem of the inevitable default. They merely add to the misery
before the default.
Indeed,
we have seen neither hide nor hair of inflation or high interest
rates during the current run up of the debt. It is critical to bear
in mind, too, that these deficits are not a result of the government
trying to buy something it cannot otherwise afford (as would be
the case for you or me). Rather, they are setting out to generate
sufficient demand for goods and services to employ all those willing
to work (that said, not every kind of government spending does this
effectively, but that's a different question). As there is no limit
to how much debt we can successfully carry, we should be aggressively
pursuing the latter goal rather than talking about being "fiscally
responsible." There is nothing responsible about leaving over 12
million Americans out of work.
We have
plenty of problems in the world. No point in making one up.
CONCLUSION
This appeared
in Forbes. The article cited a list of supposed experts,
with Alan Greenspan at the head of the list. Somehow, the author
expects us to take his argument seriously. We are also supposed
to take his cited experts seriously, beginning with Alan Greenspan.
We are supposed to imagine that debts are forever, that they need
not be repaid, that credit is eternal, that the Baby boomers are
not retiring by the millions, that digits can overcome economic
theory, that Medicare is solvent, that Social Security is solvent,
and that hyperinflation is always available as a way for the government
not to default.
The nation
is run by people who share his views. So is every Western nation.
This is a
very good reason to prepare for a catastrophe, if we are lucky,
or possibly several: (1) mass inflation, stabilization, deflation,
depression, and government default, or (2) hyperinflation followed
by a default. Take your pick.
September
19, 2012
Gary
North [send him mail]
is the author of Mises
on Money. Visit http://www.garynorth.com.
He is also the author of a free 31-volume series, An
Economic Commentary on the Bible.
Copyright ©
2012 Gary North
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