The Monetization of Everything
by
Gary North
Tea Party Economist
Recently
by Gary North: 13-Year-Old
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What the Federal
Reserve System can do and what it will do are two different things.
The Federal
Reserve System can monetize anything. It can create digital money
and buy any asset it chooses to buy. There are no legal restrictions
on what it is allowed to monetize.
If it were
to do this, and it continued to do this, the dollar would fall to
zero value. This would produce hyperinflation. The result would
be the destruction of all dollar-based creditors. Debtors could
pay off their loans with the sale of an egg or a pack of cigarettes.
This is what farmers did in 1923 in Germany and Austria.
The economists
who advise the Federal Reserve System know this. The bankers who
run the banks that own the shares of the 12 regional FED banks know
this. Bernanke knows this.
The day will
come when the decision-makers on the Federal Open Market Committee
will have to fish or cut bait. They will have to decide: mass inflation
(20%) or hyperinflation (QEx). They will have to decide: recession
or hyperinflation.
Will they
see that it's really Great Depression 2 vs. hyperinflation? I don't
think so. They have been able to manipulate the economy for over
90 years between recessions and booms. Only once did it become a
depression: 1930-40. That depression became deflationary, 1931-34,
because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1934) did not
exist. Depositors took their money out and did not redeposit it.
That created monetary deflation through the bankruptcy of banks.
The fractional reserve process imploded.
The FED inflated
the monetary base in order to prevent this, contrary to the account
by Friedman and Schwartz in their famous book, "A Monetary History
of the United States" (1963). Depositors thwarted the FED, 1931-33.
A chart produced by a senior official at the St. Louis FED should
forever silence those economists who think that Friedman and Schwartz
proved the case of FED "complacency." It won't, of course. The Friedman/Schwartz
story is just too convenient for pressuring the FED to inflate.
Friedman and Schwartz wrote the single most important book favoring
FED inflation ever written, because it is universally believed in
academia. The only section of the book ever cited by mainstream
economists is the section on the FED in the early 1930s. That story
is analytical and historical bunk. Here
are the facts.
Today, depositors
could do it again. If the FDIC were not backed up by a $600 billion
line of credit from Congress, we might see it happen again. But
there is a line of credit. That calms depositors.
The creditor
Congress is the world's biggest debtor. Congress is running
a $1.2 trillion deficit each year. But it has central banks to cover
the debt: Japan's, China's, America's. So, the depositors believe
that Congress can save the FDIC, which will save the banks. They
leave their money in banks. If they pull money out of bank A, they
deposit it in bank B. The system does not lose deposits. There is
no deflation. The fractional reserve system survives.
The system
has worked for a long time. The day of ultimate reckoning has been
delayed. I think this has given central bankers a sense of confidence.
They will think that one more refusal to go to hyperinflation will
succeed. They will not believe that the refusal to pump new digital
money into the system will bring on Great Depression 2. They will
believe in their ability to manipulate the system one more time.
The system
overcame the collapse of Lehman Brothers. They will assume that
credit liquidation will be orderly. If it isn't, they can intervene
one more time.
DEFERRING
THE DAY OF RECKONING
The leader
of Europe's central bank has for months verbally played the deferral
game, while inflating wildly. Mario Draghi has kept saying that
the ECB will not monetize PIIGS's debts, but it has done so indirectly
by allowing national central banks and commercial banks to buy PIIGS's
bonds, and then use these bonds as collateral for ECB loans. It
has been a version of Angela Merkel's verbal assurances that she
will not sell out her nation to the Eurocrats, and then selling
out her nation to the Eurocrats every time. "Her lips say no-no,
but her eyes say yes-yes."
On July 26,
Draghi gave a speech in London. He finally let his rhetoric catch
up with the ECB's actual practices. He said the following. "Within
our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve
the euro. And believe me, it will be enough. To the extent that
the size of the sovereign premia [borrowing costs] hamper the functioning
of the monetary policy transmission channels, they come within our
mandate."
World stock
markets rose by at least 1% within minutes. Spain's stock market
rose a huge 6% in hours.
What he said
was in fact a cry of desperation. He does not know what to do, other
than to inflate. He knows he must break the Maastricht treaty that
created the EU, but he does not have any choice. He has defined
out of existence the treaty's limits on the ECB. He defines his
mandate broadly. He knows that Spain is close to default. The ECB
must buy Spain's bonds, or else provide funds for some other agencies
to buy Spain's bonds. The weekend summit meeting less than a month
ago has already broken down. Spain's ten-year bond rate went above
the failsafe 7% figure.
The European
banking system is being propped up by monetary inflation. There
are signs that this cannot go on much longer, but the central bankers
have enormous self-confidence. They believe that fiat money can
delay any major crisis. They believe that fiat money is the ultimate
ace in the hole. So do Keynesians. So do politicians. They really
do believe that the exclusive government monopoly authority to supervise
the creation of digits is the basis of prosperity.
Investors
invest digits called money. They are convinced that the ability
of central banks to create digits has created a failsafe for investors'
digits. They believe that a prudent mixture of digit-generating
investments will gain them a positive rate of return, as measured
in digits, just so long as the total number of digits is always
increasing. This is the key to every investment strategy that is
tied to "digits invested now, more digits to invest later": an ever-increasing
supply of digits.
You might
think that investors would judge their success in investing by increased
real income: stuff, not digits. But the vast majority of investors
assume that stuff will inevitably take care of itself, if only the
supply of digits is increasing. Here is the mantra of this generation:
"The system of stuff production depends on a steady increase in
the supply of digits."
This is why
there is no resistance to central bank monetization. On the contrary,
there is cheering. The journalists follow the economists. The economists
have adopted the mantra of digits with the zealous commitment of
any priesthood. Milton Friedman is their high priest.
FRIEDMAN,
NOT KEYNES
Keynes argued
for government spending to save the system. This is universally
believed by academic economists. But there is a problem with this
scenario: interest rates. Governments must borrow. From whom? At
what rates?
Keynes had
little to say analytically about central banks, yet central banking
is at the heart of government debt. Economists can intone the mantra,
"government spending," but this does not answer the economist's
universal question: "At what price?"
That is where
Friedman enters the picture. Keynes was the prophet of government
spending. Friedman was the guy with the green eyeshade in the back
room. He ran the books. Without Friedman, Keynes & Company would
have folded during World War II.
Keynes was
the academic prophet of big government. Friedman was the high priest
of big central banking. The high priest raises the money. Every
prophet needs a high priest, or else the religion disappears.
Friedman
argued for decades that the banking system need only create
money at a rate of 3% to 5% per annum for the economy to prosper.
I never saw
anyone make this observation: 5% is 66% more than 3%, so Friedman
was not recommending anything like stable money. Nevertheless, the
monetarists adopted his mantra. So, the free markets' best-known
academic defenders universally accepted the legitimacy of a government
monopoly, central banking, as well as a government-licensed cartel,
fractional reserve commercial banking. Only the Austrian School
economists rejected this legal arrangement, and there were few of
them. None had any influence.
Keynes gets
the credit as the supreme economist of the era, but Friedman was
more important operationally. Keynes promoted government spending,
but said little about central banking. In contrast, Friedman provided
the theoretical justification for the funding of government deficits
by central bank purchases of government debt.
The trouble
was this: the deficits during major recessions were so large that
a steady 3% to 5% increase in the money supply did not suffice.
More was needed. The central bankers then took their monopoly and
put it to immediate use: unlimited expansion of money. That was
what the FED did in 2008.
The predictability
of steady monetary inflation never was honored. Friedman's defense
of central banking was well-received by the Keynesian economists.
His limit of 3% to 5% was of course ignored. The central banks did
not adhere to the limit, any more than the Internal Revenue Service
adhered to the 1943 withholding tax law as a temporary wartime measure.
Friedman provided the intellectual support for that law, too.
Once you consecrate
the priesthood, you will find that the limitations which you specified
are no longer taken seriously by the priesthood. Call this the Nadab
and Abihu factor. Call it the sons of Eli factor. It always appears.
Friedman gave
repeated theoretical justifications for the actions of the federal
government, based on an official position of limited government.
In the two most important areas of economic policy, income taxation
and central bank legitimacy, he stood squarely behind the federal
government.
Once consecrated,
the government agencies paid no attention to his practical restrictions
on the exercise of power. This is the curse of everyone who recommends
a government policy to make government more efficient. This merely
furthers the expansion of the power of government into new areas
of the economy. Then the politicians and central bankers ignore
the recommended practical limits that were supposed to guarantee
liberty and its blessings. The camel's supposedly efficient nose
becomes its entry point into the tent.
LIMITS
TO HYPERINFLATION
The main limit
is a currency unit of zero value. The idea behind hyperinflation
is for the government to be able to buy goods and services without
raising visible taxes. This policy ceases to function when the monetary
unit falls to zero value. At that point, the currency unit has only
one practical economic function: to pay off debt.
Once the state
overcomes its debts through hyperinflation, the benefits to the
state of further inflation cease to exist. It can no longer buy
anything of value.
The economy
goes to barter before hyperinflation reaches its theoretical limit
of zero purchasing power. The tax authorities cannot easily assess
taxes in barter transactions. Most barter transactions are not recorded.
If a business must report these transactions, it pays its taxes
at the end of the tax period. By then, the purchasing power of the
monetary unit has fallen. A tax bill is a debt. Hyperinflated money
is excellent for paying debts.
So, the government
starts over. It kills the old currency. It knocks off lots of zeroes.
Then the process begins anew. But, in the meantime, the middle class
was wiped out. Pension funds are gone. Bonds are worthless. The
political system has had a major defeat. The government promised
security and justice, and it delivered insecurity and injustice.
Western Europe
experienced hyperinflation in only two nations in peacetime: Germany
and Austria, 1921 through 1923. Hungary had the worst inflation
ever recorded immediately after World War II. But it was not an
industrial economy. Israel had hyperinflation in the mid-1980s,
but pulled back short of the destruction of the shekel. Argentina
had hyperinflation in the late 1980s.
My point is
this: central bankers are aware of the short-term effects of hyperinflation.
These effects cause losses in production. They disrupt the banks,
especially the large banks. Banks lend money; then they are repaid
in money of vastly depreciated value.
The capital
base of the nation is undermined. The lenders of long-term money
are wiped out. They have no money to lend after the period of hyperinflation
is over. If they saw it coming and bought hard assets such as real
estate, as few do, then in the recessionary period after hyperinflation
they have illiquid assets. If they bought foreign currencies, they
are sitting pretty, but few investors buy foreign currencies.
Central bankers
are trained in the basics of banking. They recognize the threat
that hyperinflation poses to the banking system. The social order
is threatened. Their pensions are threatened. They resist hyperinflation.
IS HYPERINFLATION
POSSIBLE?
In the early
1970s, a debate broke out in the hard-money camp between deflationists,
who argued that hyperinflation is no longer possible, and the inflationists,
who said it was inevitable. Both positions have yet to be proven.
Both positions still have their defenders.
In the 1970s,
the positions were best represented by John Exter (deflationist)
and Franz Pick (inflationist). Pick was the first person I ever
heard refer to government bonds as certificates of guaranteed confiscation.
Exter argued
that the financial structure is leveraged to such a degree that
central bank inflation could not save it from massive de-leveraging
in a panic. So, despite the attempts of central banks to re-liquify
the economy, the collapsing financial structure would produce price
deflation.
I do not recall
that he brought up the issue of excess reserves. This may be a problem
with my memory rather than Exter's analysis. But what we have seen
since 2008 seems to confirm one part of his thesis, namely, the
lack of effect on consumer prices of Federal Reserve monetary base
inflation. But there has not been a collapse of financial asset
prices. So far, his case is not proven.
He said there
would be a massive run on gold in this deflation. Why? Because gold
is the ultimate liquid asset. He came up with a pyramid of increasing
liquidity. Gold was at the bottom. We still see this pyramid in
economic analysis. You
can see it here.
Yet gold fell
by 25% in 2008, contrary to his prediction. This calls into question
his theory of over-leveraged financial markets as the cause of deflation.
What he never
showed was this: how the total money supply could contract in a
world in which banks are protected from collapse by central banks.
If the money supply does not fall, then there is no reason for consumer
prices to fall. Asset prices could fall, but that has nothing directly
to do with consumer prices.
Those of us
who were anti-deflationists kept coming back to this argument. The
price movements within the capital markets are not the same as price
movements in the consumer goods markets.
Then there
is this. The Federal Reserve is legally allowed to monetize anything.
It can monetize stocks, bonds, commodities anything.
The FED can
buy the S&P 500. It can buy S&P futures. It can buy individual shares.
If there were ever a collapse of share prices as a result of fears
over Federal Reserve deflation, the FED could monetize the entire
stock market.
The FED can
enter markets in a panic sell-off and buy any asset class that it
chooses. It can head off the panic by serving as the buyer of last
resort, not simply the lender of last resort.
There is no
seller of an asset who would not take the FED's money. There is
no lack of trust in the FED so great that a frightened seller of
an asset will say, "Sorry, but your money's no good here." The sellers
will sell for dollars.
CONCLUSION
I do not believe
that hyperinflation is inevitable. I think it is unlikely. I do
think that a Great Default is inevitable. Governments will default
when the workers who are paying into Social Security and Medicare
finally figure out that (1) this is not in their self-interest and
(2) they outnumber the geezers.
Central bankers
are arrogant. They really do think they have the upper hand. They
really do think fiat money creation by central planners (themselves)
is more powerful than free market forces (investors). They really
do believe that they can find a suitable middle/muddle road between
deflationary collapse and hyperinflation. So, they will not pull
out all the stops. They will not hyperinflate unless Congress compels
this.
Paul Volcker
is the model. He reversed the policies of the ill-equipped G. William
Miller, who was persuaded to resign by Carter after only 18 months
in office. Volcker stuck to his guns from the fall of 1979 until
August 13, 1982. By then, the public had lost its fear of inflation.
It had gone through back-to-back recessions.
Volcker saved
the dollar and the bond market. He let the politicians pay the price:
first Carter, then Reagan. Reagan weathered the storm because the
economy had turned back up by 1984. He smashed Walter Mondale.
The
leverage is much greater today. The leverage of the big banks is
much greater. The public still trusts Bernanke and Draghi. The investors
think the central banks can save the system from a catastrophe.
I don't. But I think the central banks have their choice of catastrophes:
deflation/depression vs. hyperinflation/depression. I think they
will try to navigate a middle ground, but when push comes to shove,
they will risk a controlled deflation, with selective bailouts for
the largest banks.
The central
banks are not there to save the governments, which come and go.
They are there to save their clients: the largest banks. They know
where their bread is buttered.
But if Congress
ever nationalizes the FED, then hyperinflation is a real possibility.
July
28, 2012
Gary
North [send him mail]
is the author of Mises
on Money. Visit http://www.garynorth.com.
He is also the author of a free 31-volume series, An
Economic Commentary on the Bible.
Copyright ©
2012 Gary North
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