Jesus
on Property Rights and Resource Preservation
by
Robert Higgs
by Robert Higgs
When I began
my academic career, I was fortunate to work in a department of economics
in which several of my colleagues, including Yoram Barzel, Steven
N. S. Cheung, and Douglass C. North, had a keen interest in property
rights and their implications for economic action. I soon began
to work in several related research areas, including contractual
choice in agriculture, and over the years a number of my articles
and important parts of my books have pertained to property rights
in some fashion.
Perhaps the
most important proposition in the economics of property rights is
that people will not care for a resource they do not own as well
as they will care for a resource they do own. It is amazing how
much fashionable economic belief for example, nearly everything
ever advanced in support of socialism, as well as the bulk of what
passes for environmentalist policy proposals fails to take
adequate account of this virtually axiomatic proposition.
But dont
take my word for it or even the word of any of my illustrious
former colleagues at the University of Washington. Take the word
of Jesus of Nazareth.
In the tenth
chapter of the Gospel According to John, Jesus is trying to make
a point, but his listeners are not getting it, so he finally gives
them a parable he can be sure they will understand (verses 1113):
The
good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. The hired hand,
who is not the shepherd and does not own the sheep, sees the wolf
coming and leaves the sheep and runs away and the wolf
snatches them and scatters them. The hired hand runs away because
a hired hand does not care for the sheep. I am the good shepherd.
I know my own and my own know me.
Hired hands
must be monitored closely if the owner is to prevent them from diminishing
or destroying the value of the capital he has provided for them
to work with. In postbellum southern agriculture, for example, plantation
owners monitored sharecroppers, to whom they furnished mules, more
closely than they monitored tenants who furnished their own mules.
The typical plantation layout placed the wage workers in fields
closest to the owners house, the sharecroppers a little farther
away, and the fixed-rent tenants in the most outlying areas. This
arrangement allowed monitoring costs to be minimized. (Anyone who
wants to see a thorough survey and analysis of these contractual
arrangements might wish to consult Lee J. Alston and Robert Higgs,
Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War:
Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests, Journal of Economic History
42 [June 1982]: 32753.)
If you dont
care for economic theory or econometrics, just read the Bible.
This first
appeared in The Beacon.
May
5, 2009
Robert
Higgs [send him mail] is
senior fellow in political economy at the Independent
Institute and editor of The
Independent Review. He
is also a columnist for LewRockwell.com. His
most recent book is Neither
Liberty Nor Safety: Fear, Ideology, and the Growth of Government.
He is also the author of Depression,
War, and Cold War: Studies in Political Economy, Resurgence
of the Warfare State: The Crisis Since 9/11 and Against
Leviathan: Government Power and a Free Society.
Copyright
© 2009 Robert Higgs
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