Before the
U.S. invasion, this businessman – like millions of other Iraqis
– was ruled by a distant dictator who had little direct influence
on his life. Today, everything he does takes place under the shadow
cast by armed men who have given themselves permission to brutalize
or kill anybody who refuses to obey them.
For Mr. al-Khafaji,
it makes no material difference whether the checkpoint is manned
by U.S. soldiers, State Department-employed mercenaries, members
of Saddam’s Republican Guard, or elements of a local sectarian militia.
The problem is the presence of people who claim the right to use
aggressive violence to force him to submit to their will. The problem
is not one of geography or affiliation; it is a matter of institutionalized
immorality.
Americans who
supported the Iraq war would be scandalized by Mr. al-Khajafi’s
ingratitude. They would be wise to ponder his insight while examining
the extent to which our own country is becoming a garrison state.
They would also do well to emulate his habit of looking with acute
suspicion – and no small measure of resentment – on the oddly dressed
armed men who presume to exercise authority over us.
Democracy
is the art of inducing victims of government power to focus on the
question of who controls the government, rather than what
it does. The same can be said of the perspective encapsulated
in the slogan "Support
Your Local Police" (SYLP).
As sociologist
David Bayley pointed out, "The police are to the government
as the edge is to the knife." The police are an implement of
coercion wielded by the political class, whether they are operationally
under the control of Washington, D.C. or City Hall.
From the SYLP
perspective, the police and the "criminal justice" system
they serve exist to protect life and property against criminal violence
and fraud. If this were true, it would follow that most of those
arrested and punished would be found guilty of crimes against person
and property.
According to
the most recent available statistics regarding incarceration, however,
people convicted of actual crimes compose a very small minority
of America’s
vast and growing federal prison population. As of 2009, crimes
of violence accounted for roughly eight percent of that total, and
property crimes contributed a bit less than six percent. More than
half of all inmates were convicted of non-violent drug offenses,
and thirty-five percent were caged for what are called "public
order" offenses.
There are
instances in which police act in defense of persons and property.
Those are genuinely exceptional, because rendering that service
is not part of their formal job description: The Supreme Court has
repeatedly ruled
that police have no enforceable duty to protect individual rights.
This helps explain why, as
economist Robert Higgs pointed out roughly a decade ago, "there
are three times as many private policemen as there are public ones."
In choosing
to pay for private security assistance, Americans freely spend more
than twice the amount stolen from us each year to pay for the government’s
armed enforcement caste. This is because the government that takes
our money fails to provide the promised social good – protection
of life and property.
Writing nearly
a century ago, when our contemporary police state was in its infancy,
the
immortal H.L. Mencken protested that the government supposedly
protecting him was actually the most rapacious and tenacious enemy
of liberty and personal security. While it is possible for the typical
American to repel the aggression of private criminals, "he
can no more escape the tax-gatherer and the policemen, in all their
protean and multitudinous guises, than he can escape the ultimate
mortician. They beset him constantly, day in and day out…. They
invade his liberty, affront his dignity, and greatly incommode his
search for happiness, and every year they demand and wrest from
him a larger and larger share of his worldly goods."
The one refinement
we can make to this otherwise flawless polemical gem is to note
that the terms "tax-gatherer" and "policeman"
are functional synonyms. Both offices exist to extract wealth from
the productive at gunpoint on behalf of the political class. The
only substantive difference between them is that the latter are
granted slightly wider latitude in inflicting aggressive violence,
and equipped to do so.
As Carl Watner
pointed out in "Call
the COPS – But Not the Police," a seminal 2004 essay published
by The Voluntaryist, gathering taxes has been a core
police function since the institution was first imposed on the Anglo-Saxons
following the Norman Conquest. The feudal order implemented by William
the Conqueror was built upon the "frankpledge,"
which was the institutional foundation for a a police system designed
to collect revenue for the monarch.
The Anglo-Saxon
tribes had provided security through kinship-based groups called
"tithes" and "hundreds," who defended cattle
herds and other property and acted as posses to apprehend thieves.
Anglo-Saxon courts emphasized restitution, with any punitive damages
being used to compensate volunteers who had tracked down the offenders.
Under the frankpledge, however, the "justice" system diverted
all revenues into the king’s treasury.
Royal courts
worked tirelessly to expand the king’s jurisdiction, which was enforced
by royal appointees called shire-reeves (from which the term "sheriff"
is derived). Eventually, royal enactments criminalized efforts by
victims to seek private restitution; since such arrangements deprived
the treasury of revenue, they were seen as a form of theft. This
concept of the "King’s Peace" could be considered the
distant but recognizable ancestor of the modern notion that the
disembodied abstraction called "society" is a victim of
criminal offenses – even those in which no individual has been injured.
A heavy residue
of Anglo-Saxon tradition endured into the 18th Century.
A French visitor to London in the mid-1700s was astounded when none
of the local residents could direct him to the police – or even
recognize the term. "Good Lord! How can one expect order among
these people, who have no such a word as police in their language?"
he exclaimed.
In fact, the
term was familiar to educated 18th Century Britons, who
– as historian Leon Radzinowicz points out – considered it to be
"suggestive of terror and oppression." A 1785 Police Bill
proposed by William Pitt the Younger shattered against an iron wall
of opposition to what was regarded as a "dangerous innovation."
Until the second decade of the 19th century, the British
government’s ambition to create a standing police force was confined
to its Irish colony, where its heavily armed Royal Constabulary
field-tested methods that would later be imported to the homeland.
During the
same period, Napoleon Bonaparte, the armed evangelist of the Jacobin
revolution, created the first modern police force. Bonaparte’s ascent
to power began with a brutal police action: The massacre of 13 Vendemiaire
(October 5, 1795), during which the young Corsican general used
artillery to slaughter Royalist protesters on the streets of Paris.
By 1812, writes
David A. Bell in his book The
First Total War, large areas of Europe under Bonaparte’s
rule were afflicted with "pervasive bureaucracy, particularly
new agencies for tax collection and conscription…. To implement
the new order, there came new police forces, often staffed largely
by Frenchmen."
Presiding over
this apparatus of regimentation, extraction, and coercion was secret
police Chief Joseph Fouche, the Jacobin fanatic who prefigured Felix
Dzherzhinsky.
Bonaparte’s
star was in eclipse by 1814. However, as British historian Paul
Johnson observed in his book The
Birth of the Modern, "the golden age of the political
police" had just begun. The Congress of Vienna gave birth to
what one contemporary critic called "All sorts of wild schemes
of establishing a general police all over Europe."
At the same
time, Robert Peel, the military governor of Ireland, introduced
the so-called Peace Preservation Police, a centrally controlled
paramilitary auxiliary to the 20,000-man military force garrisoned
on the island. Peel explained that the force "was not meant
to meet any temporary emergency" but rather intended to become
a permanent institution. In 1829, Peel was England’s Home Secretary.
With Parliament’s resistance at low ebb, Peel proposed the creation
of the Metropolitan Police.
"The new
police institution had many supporters in government, but opposition
was to be found in the wider society," wrote Watner in The
Voluntaryist. "The fundamental principles behind the force
were seen as … anathema to Whig political principles, which emphasized
`liberty over authority, the rights of the people against the prerogatives
of the Crown, local accountability in place of centralization, and
governance by the "natural" rulers of society instead
of salaried, government-appointed bureaucrats.’"
Populist
parliamentarian William Cobbett, an outspoken foe of "tax-eaters,"
was among the fiercest critics of the Metropolitan Police, which
he saw as the vanguard of a country-wide army of occupation.
"Tyranny
always comes by slow degrees," Cobbett declared in an 1833
speech in Parliament, "and nothing could tend to illustrate
that fact [better] than the history of police in this country."
Less than a generation ago, Cobbett pointed out, the very term "police"
was "completely new among us." Now, owing to Peel’s innovations,
London was now overrun with "Blue Locusts" – "a police
with numbered collars and embroidered cuffs, a body of men as regular
as the King’s service, as fit for domestic war as the redcoats were
for foreign war."
In 1783, the
last of King George’s occupation troops were evicted from New York.
In 1844, New York City’s municipal government became the first in
America to embrace Robert Peel’s system of paramilitary police.
This amounted to exchanging Redcoats for "Blue Locusts."
Other major cities – New Orleans and Cincinnati in 1852, Boston,
Philadelphia, and Chicago in 1855 – soon followed. State police
agencies began to appear in the last decade of the 19th
century, and first decades of the 20th.
While those
police agencies were locally controlled, they were not servants
of the public; they were instruments of the political class that
created them. On the western frontier, where political power was
either radically decentralized or entirely theoretical, security
for person and property was "protected by private policemen
who were paid by – and, so, responsible to – the community where
they served," notes libertarian
writer Wendy McElroy.
Unlike the
European gendarmes and royal British "shire-reeves," McElroy
points out, "Western sheriffs did protect people and
property; they did rescue schoolmarms and punish cattle rustlers.
Their mission was to keep the peace by preventing violence."
Most importantly,
in the Old West, sheriffs and marshals didn’t claim a monopoly on
the legitimate use of force. Thus when corrupt sheriffs like Montana’s
Henry Plummer or Idaho’s David Updike used their office as cover
to operate as "road agents" (horse thieves and highwaymen),
they
were arrested, tried, and punished by private "committees of
vigilance."
The only legitimate
role for a peace officer is to interpose himself on behalf of individuals
threatened by aggressive violence. That is a role that can (and
should) be carried out by any law-abiding individual – including
instances when the purveyor of aggressive violence is a police officer
or other state official.
In the
recent nationally coordinated police crack-downs on "Occupy"
protesters we have seen the following scenario play out numerous
times: Peaceful demonstrators confront riot police; individual
riot policeman commits physical aggression against protester, then
immediately escalates the conflict by using potentially lethal force;
when the crowd reacts, the other police officers – rather than coming
to the aid of the victim – form a protective barricade (I call it
a "thugscrum") around the assailant.
Anytime a police
officer commits an act of aggressive violence he is engaged in a
criminal assault. If his fellow officers won't intervene to stop
him, law-abiding citizens have the moral authority to do so. But
this simply won't do, tut-tuts the program manual for the
national Support Your Local Police campaign:
"The local
police are not your enemy. Your committee is not here to attack
them, blame them for violating the Constitution or your civil liberties
because they are enforcing a measure of the Patriot Act or conducting
a joint Federal and State anti-terror drill. Those are federal issues,
which the local police in some cases may have already have little
to no say if they are to continue receiving their additional Homeland
Security funds, new equipment and weaponry.... We urge all responsible
citizens in this community to work with us to ...[s]upport our local
police in the performance of their duties [and] oppose all
harassment or interference with law enforcement personnel as they
carry out their assigned tasks.... [We must accept] our
responsibilities to our local police, to defend them against unjust
attacks, make them proud and secure in their vital profession, and
to offer them our support in word and deed wherever possible." (Emphasis
added.)
It apparently
didn't occur to the author of that passage that claiming citizens
have "responsibilities to our local police" is to assume that the
people exist to serve the government, rather than the reverse. Furthermore,
it's pretty clear that from this perspective, the police have no
reciprocal "responsibilities" to the citizenry.
At the very
least it would mean refusing to interfere when an armored bully
carries out his "assigned task" of brutally assaulting a helpless,
unarmed citizen, rather than carrying out the moral duty to do whatever
is feasible to prevent the crime or end the attack.
"When
law and morality are in contradiction to each other," observed
Frederic Bastiat, "the citizen finds himself in the cruel alternative
of either losing his moral sense, or of losing respect for the law
– two evils of equal magnitude...." The "Support Your Local Police"
perspective undermines morality by enshrining unconditional support
for the police – who are, as SYLP admits, simply local affiliates
of a nationalized Homeland Security system – as a supposed civic
duty.
No individual
or institution has the moral right to use aggressive force. That
principle applies not only to the Federal Leviathan, but to the
loathsome little replicas of that vile beast found in every city,
county, and state. Rather than helping to consolidate the existing
police state, supporters of the rule of law should work to end their
local government's monopoly on the police power – with the ultimate
objective of abolishing it outright.