Washington's
Militarized Mindset
by
Tom Engelhardt
TomDispatch
Recently
by Tom Engelhardt: Till
Death Do Us Part
The
Military Solution
The Lessons Washington Can't Draw From the Failure of the Military
Option
Americans may
feel more distant from war than at any time since World War II began.
Certainly, a smaller percentage of us less
than 1% serves in the military in this all-volunteer
era of ours and, on the face of it, Washington's constant warring
in distant lands seems barely to touch the lives of most Americans.
And yet the
militarization of the United States and the strengthening of the
National Security Complex continues to accelerate. The Pentagon
is, by now, a world unto itself, with a staggering budget at a moment
when no other power or combination of powers comes
near to challenging
this country's might.
In the post-9/11
era, the military-industrial complex
has been thoroughly
mobilized under the rubric of "privatization" and
now goes to war with the Pentagon. With its $80
billion-plus budget, the intelligence bureaucracy has simply
exploded. There are so
many competing agencies and outfits, surrounded by a universe
of private
intelligence contractors, all enswathed in a penumbra of secrecy,
and they have grown so large, mainly under the Pentagon's aegis,
that you could say intelligence is now a ruling way of life in Washington
and it, too, is being thoroughly militarized. Even
the once-civilian CIA has undergone a process of para-militarization
and now runs its own "covert" drone wars in Pakistan and
elsewhere. Its director, a widely hailed retired
four-star general, was previously the U.S. war commander in
Iraq and then Afghanistan, just as the National
Intelligence Director who oversees the whole intelligence labyrinth
is a retired Air Force lieutenant general.
In a sense,
even the military has been "militarized." In these last
years, a secret
army of special operations forces, 60,000 or more strong and
still
expanding, has grown like an incubus inside the regular armed
forces. As the CIA's drones have become the president's private
air force, so the special ops troops are his private army, and are
now given free rein to go about the business of war in their own
cocoon of secrecy in areas far removed from what are normally considered
America's war zones.
Diplomacy,
too, has been militarized. Diplomats work ever more closely
with the military, while the State Department is transforming itself
into an unofficial arm of the Pentagon as the secretary of
state is happy
to admit as well as of the weapons
industry.
And keep in
mind that we now have two Pentagons, thanks to the establishment
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is focused,
among other things, on militarizing
our southern border. Meanwhile, with the help of the DHS,
local police forces nationwide have, over the last decade, been
significantly up-armored
and have, in the name of fighting terrorism, gained a distinctly
military patina. They have ever more access to elaborate weaponry
and gadgets, including billions of dollars of surplus
military equipment of every sort, often being funneled to once
peaceable small town police departments.
The
Military Solution in the Greater Middle East
Militarization
in this country is hardly a new phenomenon. It can be traced
back decades, but the process hit warp speed in the post-9/11 years,
even if the U.S. still lacks the classic look of a militarized society.
Almost unnoticed has been an accompanying transformation of the
mindset of Washington what might be called the militarization
of solutions.
If the institutions
of American life and governance are increasingly militarized, then
it shouldn't be surprising that the problems facing the country
are ever more often framed in militarized terms and that the only
solutions considered are similarly militarized. This paucity
of imagination, this constraining of what might be possible, seems
especially evident in the Greater Middle East.
In fact, Washington's
record there, seldom if ever collected in one place, should be eye-opening.
Start with a dose of irony: before the invasion of Iraq in 2003,
it was a commonplace among neoconservatives to label the region
extending across the oil heartlands of the planet, from North Africa
to the Chinese border in Central Asia, "the arc of instability."
After a decade in which Washington has applied its military might
and thoroughly militarized solutions to the region, that decade-old
world now looks remarkably "stable."
Here, in shorthand,
is a little regional scorecard of what American militarization has
meant in the Greater Middle East, 2001-2012:
Pakistan:
The U.S. has faced a multitude of complex problems in this nuclear
nation beset with insurgent movements, its tribal areas providing
sanctuary to both Afghan and Pakistani rebels and jihadis,
and its intelligence service entangled in a complicated relationship
with the Taliban leadership as well as other rebel groups fighting
in Afghanistan. Washington's response has been as Secretary
of Defense Leon Panetta recently labeled
it war. In 2004, the Bush administration launched
a drone assassination campaign in the country's tribal
borderlands largely focused on al-Qaeda leaders (combined with a
few cross-border special forces raids).
Those rare robotic air strikes have since expanded into something
like a full-scale covert drone war that is killing
civilians, is intensely unpopular throughout Pakistan, and by
now is clearly meant to punish the Pakistani leadership for its
transgressions as well.
Frustrated
by what they consider Pakistani intransigence, elements in the U.S.
military and intelligence community are reportedly
pressing to add a new set of cross-border joint special operations/Afghan
commando raids to the present incendiary mix. American air
strikes from Afghanistan that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers last
November, with no apologies
offered for seven months, brought to a boil a crisis in relations
between Washington and Islamabad, with the Pakistani government
closing off the country to American war supplies headed for Afghanistan.
(That added a couple
of billion dollars to the Pentagon's expenses there before the
crisis was ended
with a grudging apology this week). The whole process has
clearly contributed to the destabilization of nuclear Pakistan.
Afghanistan:
Following a November 2001 invasion (light on invading U.S. troops),
the U.S. opted for a full-scale occupation and reconstruction of
the country. In the process, it managed to spur the reconstruction
and reconstitution of the previously deeply unpopular and defeated
Taliban movement. An insurgent war followed. Despite
a massive
surge of U.S. forces, CIA agents, special operations troops,
and private contractors into the country, the calling
in of air power in a major way, and the expansion of a program
of "night
raids" by special ops types and the CIA, success has not
followed. By the end of 2014, the U.S. is scheduled to withdraw
its main combat forces from what is likely to be a thoroughly destabilized
country.
Iran:
In a program long aimed at regime
change (but officially focused on the country's nuclear program),
the U.S. has clamped energy sanctions often seen as an act
of war on Iran, supported a special operations campaign of
unknown proportions (including cross-border
actions), run a massive CIA drone
surveillance program in the country's skies, and (with the Israelis)
loosed
at least two
major malware "worms" against the computer systems and
centrifuges of its nuclear facilities, which even the Pentagon defines
as acts of war. It has also backed a massive
build-up of U.S. naval
and air
power in the Persian Gulf and of military
bases in countries on Iran's peripheries, along
with "comprehensive multi-option war-planning" for
a possible 2013 strike at Iran's nuclear facilities. (Though
little is known about it, an assassination
campaign against Iranian nuclear scientists has usually been
blamed on the Israelis. Now that the joint U.S.-Israeli authorship
of acts of cyberwar against Iran has been confirmed, however, it
is at least reasonable to wonder whether the U.S. might also have
had a hand in these killings.) All of this has embroiled the
region and brought it to the edge
of yet more war, while in no obvious way shaking the Iranian regime.
Iraq:
The U.S. invaded in March 2003, occupying the country. It
fought (and essentially lost) an eight-year-long counterinsurgency
war, withdrawing its last troops at the end of 2011, but leaving
behind in Baghdad the world's largest, most
militarized embassy. The country, now an ally
and trading partner of Iran, remains remarkably unreconstructed
and significantly destabilized,
with regular
bombing campaigns in its cities.
Kuwait:
Just across the border from Iraq, the U.S. has continued a build-up
of forces. In the future, according to a U.S. Senate report,
there could be up to 13,000
U.S. personnel permanently stationed in the country.
Yemen:
Washington, long a supporter of the country's strong-man ruler,
now backs the successor regime. (In Yemen, as elsewhere, Washington
has been deeply uncomfortable with Arab-Spring-style democracy movements
among its allies.) For years, it has had an air campaign underway
in the southern part of the country aimed at insurgents linked to
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). More recently, it
has put at least small
numbers of special operations troops on the ground there as
advisers and trainers and has escalated
a combined CIA drone and Air Force manned-plane air campaign in
southern Yemen. There have been at least 23
air strikes already this year, evidently causing significant
civilian casualties, reportedly radicalizing
southerners, increasing support for AQAP, and helping further
destabilize this impoverished and desperate land.
Bahrain:
Home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, tiny Bahrain, facing a democratic
uprising of its repressed Shiite majority, called in the Saudi military
on a mission of suppression. The U.S. has offered
military aid
and support to the ruling Sunni monarchy.
Syria:
In radically destabilized Syria, where a democracy uprising has
morphed into a civil war with sectarian overtones that threatens
to further destabilize the region, including Lebanon
and Iraq, the CIA has now been dispatched
to the Turkish border. Its job: to direct weapons to rebels
of Washington's choice (assuming that the CIA, with its dubious
record, can sort the democrats from the jihadis).
The weapons themselves are arriving, according to the New York
Times, via a "network of intermediaries including Syria's
Muslim Brotherhood and paid for by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar."
It's a project that has "this can't end well" written
all over it.
Somalia:
Long a failed state, Somalia has suffered, among other things,
through a U.S.-fostered
Ethiopian invasion back in 2006
(and another more recently), drone attacks, CIA
and special forces operations, a complicated U.S. program to subsidize
a force of African (especially Ugandan) troops in the capital and
support for a Kenyan
invasion in the south each step in the process seemingly
leading to further fragmentation, further radicalization, and greater
extremism.
Egypt:
Ever since Tahrir Square, Washington has been focused on its
close ties with the Egyptian military high command (key figures
from which visit
Washington every year) and on the billions of dollars in military
aid it continues
to provide to that military, despite the way it has usurped
democratic rule.
Libya:
The Obama administration called in the U.S. Air Force (along with
air power from NATO allies) to support an inchoate uprising and
destroy the regime of long-time strong-man Muammar Gaddafi.
In this they were successful. The long-term results still
remain unknown. (See, for instance, the Islamist revolt in
destabilized neighboring Mali.)
How
to Set the Planet on Fire and Learn Nothing
This remains
a partial list, lacking, to give but one example, the web of drone
bases being set up from the Seychelles
Islands and Ethiopia
to the Arabian Peninsula clearly meant for expanded drone
wars across the region. Nonetheless, it is a remarkable example
of the general ineffectiveness of applying military or militarized
solutions to the problems of a region far from your own shores.
From Pakistan and Afghanistan to Yemen and Somalia, the evidence
is already in: such "solutions" solve little or nothing,
and in a remarkable number of cases seem only to increase the instability
of a country and a region, as well as the misery of masses of people.
And yet the
general lack of success from 2002 on and a deepening frustration
in Washington have just led to a stronger conviction that some recalibrated
version of a military solution (greater surges, lesser surges, no
invasions but special forces and drones, smaller "footprint,"
larger naval presence, etc.) is the only reasonable way to go.
In fact, military
solutions of every sort have such a deep-seated grip on Washington
that the focus there might be termed obsessive. This has been
particularly obvious when it comes to the CIA's drone wars.
Back in the Vietnam War years, President Lyndon Johnson was said
to have driven his generals crazy by "micromanaging" the
conflict, especially in weekly lunch meetings in which he insisted
on picking specific targets for the air campaign against North Vietnam.
These days,
however, Johnson almost looks like a laissez-faire war president.
After all, thanks
to the New York Times, we know that the White House
has a "nominating" process to compile a "kill list"
of terror suspects, and that the president
himself decides which drone air attacks should then be launched,
not target area by target area, but individual by individual.
He is choosing specific individuals to kill in the Pakistani, Yemeni,
and Somali backlands.
It should be
considered a sign of the times that, whatever shock this news may
have caused in Washington (mainly because of possible administration
leaks
about the nature of the "covert" drone program),
few
have even mentioned presidential micromanaging, nor, it seems, are
any generals up in arms. Some may have found the "nomination"
process shocking, but rare are those who seem to think it strange
that a president of the United States should be involved in choosing
individuals (including U.S. citizens) for assassination-by-drone
in distant lands.
The truth is
that such "solutions," first tested in the Greater Middle
East, are now being applied (even if, as yet, in far more modest
ways) from Africa
to Central
America. In Africa, I suspect you could track the growing
destabilization of parts of that continent to the setting up of
a U.S. command for the region (Africom)
in 2007 and in subsequent years the slow movement of drones,
special
forces operatives, private contractors, and others into a region
that already has problems enough.
Here's a 2012
American reality then: as a great power, the U.S. has an increasingly
limited toolkit, into which it is reaching far more often for ever
more similar tools. The idea that the globe is a chessboard,
that Washington is in control of the game, and that each militarized
move it makes will have a reasonably predictable result couldn't
be more dangerous. The evidence of the last decade is clear
enough: there is little less predictable or more likely to go awry
than the application of military force and militarized solutions,
which are cumulatively incendiary in unexpected ways, and in the
end threaten to set whole regions on fire. None of this, however,
seems to register in Washington.
The United
States is commonly said to be a great power in decline, but the
militarization of American policy and thinking at
home and abroad is not. It has Washington, now a capital of
perpetual war, in its grip.
This
process began, post-9/11, with the soaring
romanticism of the Bush administration about, as the president
put it, the power of the "greatest
force for human liberation the world has ever known" (a.k.a.
the U.S. military) to change the world. It was a fundamental
conviction of Bush and his top officials that the most powerful
military on the planet could bring any state in the Greater Middle
East to heel in a "cakewalk."
Today, in the
wake of two failed wars on the Eurasian continent, a de-romanticized
version of that conviction has become the deeply embedded, increasingly
humdrum way of life of a militarized Washington. It will remain
so.
If Barack Obama,
the man who got
Bin Laden, is reelected, nothing of significance is likely to
change in this regard. If Mitt Romney wins, the process is
likely to accelerate, possibly moving from global misfire, failure,
and obsession to extreme global fantasy, with consequences
from Iran to Russia to China difficult now to imagine.
This article
originally appeared at TomDispatch.com.
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July
6, 2012
Tom
Engelhardt [send him mail]
co-founder
of the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com, is the co-founder of
the American Empire
Project. His book, The
End of Victory Culture, has recently been updated in a newly
issued edition. He edited, and his work appears in, the first best
of TomDispatch book, The
World According to TomDispatch: America in the New Age of Empire
(Verso), an alternative history of the mad Bush years. He is also
the author of The
American Way of War: How Bush’s Wars Became Obama’s and The
United States of Fear. His latest book is Terminator
Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050 (with
Nick Turse).
Copyright
© 2012 Tom Engelhardt
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