Looking
Back at 'The Good War'
by
Patrick
J. Buchanan
Recently
by Patrick J. Buchanan: A
Conspiracy of Counterfeiters
In the early
morning hours of Sept. 1, 1939, 72 years ago, the German army crossed
the Polish frontier.
On Sept. 3,
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, having received no reply
to his ultimatum demanding a German withdrawal, declared that a
state of war now existed between Great Britain and Germany.
The empire
followed the mother country in. The second world war was on. It
would last six years, carry off scores of millions and end with
Germany in ruins, half of Europe under Josef Stalin's rule and the
British Empire on the way to collapse.
Though it may
prove to be the mortal wound that brings about the death of the
West, most today accept World War II as inevitable, indeed as "the
good war."
For it is said
and believed that Adolf Hitler was not only the incarnation of evil
but also out to conquer, first Poland and then Europe and then the
world.
To stop such
a monster, one must risk everything.
Which makes
these two sentences in the final chapter of British historian Richard
Overy's new book, 1939:
Countdown to War, riveting:
"Few historians
now accept that Hitler had any plan or blueprint for world conquest.
... (R)ecent research has suggested that there were almost no plans
for what to do with a conquered Poland and that the vision of a
new German empire ... had to be improvised almost from scratch."
But if Hitler
had no "plan or blueprint for world conquest," this raises perhaps
the great question of the 20th century.
What was Britain's
stake in a Polish-German territorial quarrel to justify a war from
which the British nation and empire might never recover?
How the war
came about is the subject of Overy's book.
By August 1939,
Hitler had come to believe that Polish intransigence over the city
of Danzig meant Germany would have to resolve the issue by force.
But he desperately did not want a war with Britain like the one
in which he had fought from 1914-18.
To prevent
a German-Polish clash from bringing on a European war, however,
Hitler had to sever the British-Polish alliance formed the previous
spring.
To split that
alliance, Hitler negotiated his own pact with Stalin, a coup that
meant any British declaration of war to save Poland would be an
utterly futile gesture. But when the Hitler-Stalin pact was announced,
spelling Poland's doom, Britain publicly reaffirmed her commitment
to Poland.
Hitler instantly
called off an invasion set for Aug. 26.
In the last
analysis, says Overy, British "honour," Chamberlain's honoring of
his war guarantee to the Poles, caused Britain to go to war.
When and why
was this commitment given?
On March 31,
1939, Chamberlain, humiliated by the collapse of his Munich agreement
and Hitler's occupation of Prague, handed, unsolicited, a war guarantee
to a Poland then led by a junta of colonels.
To understand
the rashness, the sheer irrationality of this decision, one must
understand the issue involved and Britain's situation in 1939.
First, the
issue: The Polish-German quarrel was over a city, Danzig, most British
leaders believed had been unjustly taken from Germany at the end
of World War I and ought to be returned.
The German
claim to Danzig was regarded as among the most just claims Germany
had from what most agreed by then had been an unjust and vindictive
Treaty of Versailles.
What did the
people of Danzig themselves want? Writes Overy:
"In May 1933,
shortly after Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, Danzig's National
Socialist Party won 38 out of the city's 72 assembly seats and formed
the city government. ... By 1936 there was a virtual one-party system.
... The strongly nationalist German population agitated in 1939
to come ... back home to Germany."
In short, the
Germans wanted their city back, and the Danzigers wanted to go home
to Germany. And most British had no objection.
Yet Britain
backed up Poland's refusal even to negotiate, and when that led
to war, Britain declared war on Poland's behalf.
Why did Britain
do it?
After all,
the war guarantee was given in response to the destruction of Czechoslovakia,
but the Polish colonels had themselves participated in that destruction
and seized a slice of Czechoslovakia.
Second, despite
the guarantee, Britain had no plans to come to Poland's aid. Third,
Britain lacked the means to stop Germany. When Hitler bombed Warsaw,
British bombers dropped leaflets on Germany.
If
Britain had no ability to save Poland and no plans to save Poland,
why encourage the Poles to fight by offering what the British knew
was a worthless war guarantee? Why declare a European and world
war for a country Britain could not save and a cause, Danzig, in
which Britain did not believe, in an Eastern Europe where Britain
had no vital interest?
Said British
Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, "(We must) throw all we can into
the scales on the side of law as opposed to lawlessness in Europe."
And throw it
all in they did. And what became of Poland?
At Tehran and
Yalta, another prime minister, Winston Churchill, ceded Poland to
Stalin's empire, in whose captivity she remained for a half-century.
September
2, 2011
Patrick
J. Buchanan [send
him mail] is co-founder and editor of The
American Conservative. He is also the author of seven books,
including Where
the Right Went Wrong, and A
Republic Not An Empire. His latest book is Churchill,
Hitler, and the Unnecessary War. See his
website.
Copyright
© 2011 Creators Syndicate
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